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Attitudes, Ideological Associations and the 
Left–Right Divide in Latin America 
Nina Wiesehomeier and David Doyle 
Abstract: Do Latin American citizens share a common conception of the 
ideological left–right distinction? And if so, is this conception linked to 
individuals’ ideological self-placement? Selecting questions from the 2006 
Latinobarómetro survey based on a core definition of the left–right divide 
rooted in political theory and philosophy, this paper addresses these ques-
tions. We apply joint correspondence analysis to explore whether citizens 
who relate to the same ideological identification also share similar and co-
herent convictions and beliefs that reflect the ideological content of the left–
right distinction. Our analysis indicates that theoretical conceptions about 
the roots of, and responsibility for, inequality in society, together with the 
translation of these beliefs into attitudes regarding the state versus market 
divide, distinguish those who self-identify with the left and those who self-
identify with the right.  
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Introduction 
The left–right distinction is one of the central categories in comparative 
politics to describe and analyze political behavior in its different facets. As 
the recent debate on the victories of left-leaning parties and candidates has 
markedly shown, this ideological dimension has also gained prominence in 
studies describing, analyzing and classifying contemporary Latin American 
politics. Using public opinion data, several scholars have, for instance, ex-
plored whether shifts in left–right self-placement of respondents can explain 
recent electoral outcomes (e.g. Arnold and Samuels 2011; Morales 2008; 
Seligson 2007; Remmer 2011). Lupu (2009) shows that respondents’ left–
right self-placement and beliefs about the predominant role of the market 
indeed shaped support for the left, in addition to voters’ socio-economic 
characteristics such as class and ethnicity. On a more general note, Colomer 
(2005) demonstrates that Latin American electorates are consistently located 
on the left–right dimension, and Harbers, de Vries, and Steenbergen (forth-
coming) illustrate that the variability in left–right preferences of voters can 
be attributed to individual and country-level characteristics. Yet, from a 
comparative perspective, we actually have little knowledge about whether 
voters in the region do form coherent groups along ideological lines and 
thus, whether citizens with the same ideological identication, in fact, share 
common and coherent convictions.  
So far, exploration of the substantive meaning of left and right and its 
ideological content has been primarily confined to the elite level (see for 
instance Power and Zucco 2009; Puig and Cué 2008; Sáez and Valduvieco 
2008). Studies using elite surveys have shown that legislators in Latin Ameri-
can countries have a clear and coherent understanding of the ideological 
meaning of left and right (Rosas 2005; Zoco 2006). Empirical analyses of 
the electorate, on the other hand, are rare to non-existent. However, wheth-
er voters consistently maintain a coherent ideological stance will have im-
portant implications for the nature of party-voter linkages. In the context of 
Latin American countries however, this linkage has been primarily described 
as one based on clientelism and personalism, amid repeated skepticism 
about the utility of the left–right distinction for the region.  
The objective of this article1 is thus to shed light on this question. We 
follow a recent appeal to base the measurement of political parties’ positions 
on the left–right dimension on a deductive approach rooted in political 
1  Nina Wiesehomeier thanks the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for 
research support through the project ‘New Political Conflicts and Party Strategies: 
A Comparative Analysis of the Politicization of Identity, European Integration and 
Immigration’ (CSO2010-15143). 
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theory and philosophy and apply it to the electorate. Thus, in our denition, 
we follow Jahn (2011) who in line with Bobbio (1996) (see also Luna and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2011) traces the core distinction of left and right to dif-
ferent attitudes towards equality and inequality as the constitutive element of 
this ideological divide. We use data from the 2006 Latinobarómetro survey 
wave, which, given the questions asked, offers us the possibility to explore 
whether behind the labels of left and right, we indeed observe individuals 
with like-minded perspectives on equality.  
To do so, this paper employs joint correspondence analysis (in the fol-
lowing JCA), an explorative method especially useful for our purpose here, 
since it aims at uncovering associations among categorical data. It allows the 
inclusion of multiple questions, hence, in our case, the inclusion of multiple 
manifestations of equality, and computes weights to maximize the correla-
tion among observed responses. This, in turn, enables us to relate those 
weights to the left–right self-placements of individuals to see whether they 
are meaningfully connected. In the remainder of this paper we will discuss 
the conceptualization of left and right, the questions chosen to represent 
attitudes towards (in)equality and present our results from the joint corre-
spondence analyses and the ordered logit models. The nal section con-
cludes.  
The Core Definition of Left and Right
It is important to note that we are not concerned with ‘ideologies’ as bodies 
of concepts and hence their substantive content and its variants, as may 
become manifest in different schools of thought, nor with the discussion of 
what constitutes an ideology. We are, though, interested in whether those 
concepts and values are manifest in such a way that they inform the elec-
torate’s ideological understanding of the labels ‘left’ and ‘right’; eventually, 
we do unite different ideologies under these labels, assuming that they share 
common characteristics that allow us to do so.  
To determine what these shared beliefs are, we follow Jahn (2011), 
who, in a recent publication, has defended the measurement of party posi-
tions on the left–right dimension based on a denition rooted in political 
theory and philosophy. To this end, he draws on Norberto Bobbio’s seminal 
work on the conceptualization of the left–right distinction, who argued that, 
at the core, the left and the right are divided by their different attitudes to-
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wards equality (Bobbio 1996).2 Thus, whereas the left aims at greater equali-
ty in society through action, the conservative right conceives of inequality as 
a given, a natural social order, and the liberal right legitimizes inequality by 
emphasizing personal responsibility for an individual’s place in society. In 
line with this interpretation, Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2011: 6) dene the 
left as “a political position, which is characterized by the idea that the main 
inequalities between the people are articial and thus seeks to overcome 
them by active state involvement.” The right, on the other hand, is dened 
“as a political position which is distinguished by the belief that the main 
inequalities between people are natural and outside the purview of the 
state.” Labeling political parties accordingly, even with varying degrees of 
left- or rightness, thus implies that we are able to do so because these politi-
cal actors convey their convictions and tenets to the public. These are, for 
instance, reected in public statements, in policy proposals political parties 
proclaim in their manifestos or campaigning, or in actual policy. Assuming 
that left and right do indeed function as shortcuts that help to structure the 
political realm, this then should be reected in citizen’s understanding of 
these terms.  
Since studies focusing on the electorate are rare however, the question, 
of course, remains whether that is the case. One notable exception which 
serves as a starting point is Zechmeister’s (2006) insightful study on Argen-
tina and Mexico. To explore whether voters attach common conceptions, if 
any, to left–right labels in the respective countries, she uses the Q-Method 
in experimental settings. Interestingly, her results demonstrate that on the 
mass level, citizens seem to be aware of the underlying differences of the left 
and the right concerning their perspective on equality. In Mexico, for in-
stance, the political right is overwhelmingly associated with the Partido Ac-
ción Nacional (PAN), and voters also associate this party with the belief that 
the economy should be left in the hands of private enterprise. In Argentina, 
the right is linked to the conviction that an authoritarian regime is some-
times necessary. Despite those idiosyncratic differences, in both countries, 
the belief in income differentials as a societal incentive is associated with the 
political right. The associations with the ideological label of the left, on the 
other hand, are more divergent. Whereas in Mexico the belief in state re-
sponsibility for the provision of a decent living and greater income equality 
are among the most important features of the political left, state intervention 
in the economy, although mentioned, is less prominent in Argentina and 
superseded by the issue of social justice.  
2  Note that this is similar to Freeden’s (1996) treatment of ideologies. For Freeden, 
ideologies contain nonnegotiable xed core concepts, adjacent concepts specifying 
the core, and peripheral elements that might change or be abolished over time. 
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Thus, Zechmeister (2006) shows that voters do indeed attach coherent 
meanings to ideological labels even if that understanding varies systematical-
ly across both, contexts and individuals. This variation also depends on how 
the elite makes use of these terms in relation to substantive content. Zech-
meister points out that Argentine politicians tend not to use these labels to 
either describe their own party, their policies or even their opponents, 
whereas the Mexican Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) makes 
explicit mention of left ideology in its party manifesto, relating it to equality 
and the ght against poverty.  
In addition, a fundamental difference seems to exist among both ideo-
logical camps when it comes to the use of ideological labels and in general, 
right parties seem to be more reluctant to do so (Zechmeister 2006). How-
ever, we believe that political elites provide the electorate with sufficient 
cues about their fundamental beliefs to enable voters to comprehend where 
they stand in ideological terms. Take for instance, the Chilean Unión 
Demócrata Independiente (UDI 2011). A look at its doctrine conrms the 
absence of any ideological label. Yet, this right leaning party is a good exam-
ple of spelling out its tenet without making explicit use of ideological terms. 
Under the heading ‘Person, Family, Society, and State,’ where the corner-
stone of the party’s fundamental principles can be found, the document 
states:  
[t]here is an objective moral order which is inscribed in human nature. 
In this moral order, the foundation of Western Christian civilization, 
must t the organization of society and must subordinate all their cul-
tural, institutional and economic development (UDI 2011, translation 
by the authors). 
a statement that ts quite nicely with the established ideological denition of 
the right above. Moreover, although the party does not mention the terms 
left or right, further down it explicitly positions itself against Marxism, stat-
ing that  
[...] [t]he weakening of marriage, the legalization of abortion and per-
missiveness against pornography and drugs are symptoms which, 
though they have various origins, are promoted or take advantage of 
this new expression of Gramscian Marxism, which now threatens 
even the most developed countries in the West. Facing the dangers of 
such aggression against the spirit and values of Western Christian cul-
ture is a prevailing obligation that the Independent Democratic Union 
is assuming and to which it alerts the Chileans (UDI 2011, translation 
by the authors). 
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Hence, although undeniable there are important idiosyncratic nuances 
among countries, as mentioned before we believe that the general political 
rhetoric, even if implicit, informs citizens substantive understanding of the 
ideological labels left and right sufficiently as to form a coherent belief sys-
tem regarding core values underlying this distinction.  
Data
Based on the conceptualization discussed in the previous section, we select 
questions from the Latinobarómetro survey that reect this core denition 
and represent its key aspects rooted in differing attitudes towards (in)equal-
ity. Furthermore, we complement this denition with what has been found 
to be the primary substantive content of the left–right dimension in Latin 
America, the state versus market divide (see Kitschelt et al. 2010; Wieseho-
meier and Benoit 2009; Wiesehomeier 2010). We thereby focus on policy 
preferences that characterize the state (or private enterprise) involvement in 
the economy, which reects the underlying ideological denition based on 
equality. We expect to nd a clear distinction among individuals self-
identifying as left or right and their opinions and position-taking on the 
selected questions. We also consider attitudes towards democracy as a politi-
cal system, yet our expectations in this regard differ. Bobbio notes that de-
mocracy, or authoritarianism, constitutes an issue which, rather than divid-
ing the left from the right, unites their extremes, such that “a left-wing ex-
tremist and a right-wing extremist share a rejection of democracy” (Bobbio 
1996: 21). Consequently, we expect the authoritarian-democratic cleavage to 
constitute a conict that is orthogonal to the left–right axis. Table 1 summa-
rizes the 16 questions selected, which we organize into the four groups de-
nominated democracy, equality values, ‘actual’ equality and state vs. market.3  
Table 1: Questions Selected 
DEMOCRACY   
 Democracy vs. authoritarianism  
 Democracy may have problems but it is still the best 
form of government  
EQUALITY VALUES   
 Respect for authority vs. questioning leaders  
 Legal solutions vs. ignore law  
 Order vs. freedom  
 Women are not qualied to work in politics  
 Politics is not a women’s place  
3  See Appendix for detailed question wording.  
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‘ACTUAL’ EQUALITY  
 A person who is born poor and works hard can become 
rich  
 Equal opportunities to exit poverty  
 State, family or individuals should take responsibility for 
decent life conditions for elderly people 
 Government vs. individuals should take responsibility for 
their welfare  
STATE VS. MARKET   
 Private sector participation in health care  
 Private sector participation in education  
 Private sector participation in mineral extraction  
 Private sector participation in water  
 Private sector participation in electricity  
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
The rst group consists of two questions aimed at gauging the attitude of 
the electorate towards democracy. We use a question that captures citizen’s 
opinion regarding the contrast between democratic regimes and author-
itarianism, together with the Churchillian question, in order to account for 
general support for democracy.4 Although our ideological denition is in 
general based on differing perspectives on equality, for reasons of clarity and 
comprehensibility, at this point, we dene separate groups which we believe 
capture different manifestations of this underlying principle. Therefore, the 
second group, equality values, is separated from the third group, ‘actual’ 
equality. Whereas the former includes questions about the role of women in 
society and respect for authority and order, the latter assembles attitudes 
reecting the more practical side of the core denition in terms of state-
versus-individual responsibility and equal opportunity.5 The fourth group, 
the state vs. market divide, in turn, focuses on the practical translation of 
these underlying preferences into the realm of economic planning, and re-
fers to differing beliefs regarding state intervention in the economy. We 
select questions to reect perceptions of private sector provision of public 
4  The codings are as follows; democracy vs. authoritarianism: 1 - democracy always 
preferable, 2 - sometimes an authoritarian regime is preferable, 3 - indifferent; 
Churchillian question: 1 - strongly agree, 2 - agree, 3 - disagree, 4 - strongly disa-
gree.  
5  The codings are as follows; respect for authorities: 1 - respect authority, 2 - ques-
tion leaders; law: 1 - ignore laws, 2 - legal solutions; order vs. freedom: 1 - order, 2 - 
freedom; women are not qualied to work in politics and politics is not a women’s 
place: 1 - mentioned, 0 - not mentioned. Hard worker: 1 - can become rich, 2 - can 
never get rich; exit poverty: 1 - equal opportunity, 2 - not equal; decent living con-
ditions for elderly people: 1 - state, 2 - family, 3 - own responsibility; welfare re-
sponsibility: 1 - person to 10 - government, recoded into 3 categories.  
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utilities, public services and private sector participation in the extractive 
industry.6  
To maintain the idea of like-minded groupings among citizens, we con-
vert the continuous left–right scale into a ve-point categorical variable. 
Based on the individual responses to the selected questions, we can then 
generate a mean for each of the ideological camps of left, center–left, center, 
center–right and right and compare how the different categories are distrib-
uted on these questions. In the following, each gure contrasts two of the 
questions taken from each group dened in Table 1, displaying the regional 
mean as a vertical line and organizing the mean values of the ideological 
categories in descending order. Interestingly, when compared in this man-
ner, there does not appear to be major variation among our ideological 
groups and moreover, we can observe some unexpected ordering among 
them.  
Figure 1: Attitudes towards Democracy 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
6  The codings for all questions included in this group are the same: 1 - totally in 
charge, 2 - major participation, 3 - minor participation, 4 - none.  
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Figure 1 shows how the ve ideological groups differ in their attitudes to-
wards democracy, as captured by our two questions. Overall, as indicated by 
the regional mean, Latin American citizens can be considered democrats. 
Interestingly, looking at the resulting ordering of the ve categories, com-
pared to all our questions, it is only regarding opinions on democracy that 
we nd an array where both, the left and the right occupy the extremes. 
Individuals in the left camp have a tendency to disagree with the assessment 
that democracy is the best system and lean towards authoritarianism; for 
both questions their mean can be found to the right of the vertical line. Yet, 
in general, we do not nd much difference among the ideological camps, 
suggesting that opinions regarding democracy no longer distinguish left and 
right in Latin America.  
In Figure 2, in turn, clearer distinctions are discernible. This gure illus-
trates the variation across the ideological groups on two questions represent-
ing equality values. The left hand pane shows that the right and the center–
right favor an orderly society, whereas the left and the center–left prefer 
living in a society in which all rights and liberties are respected, even at the 
cost of some disorder. In this case, the center lies directly on the regional 
mean. The right hand pane shows that those individuals who self-identify 
with the ideological right have a clear propensity to respect authority. Inter-
estingly, in terms of ordering, the left groups follows those on the right, 
although its mean is to the right of the regional mean, thereby indicating an 
opposing position. Yet, it is those on the center–right, the center and the 
center–left, who have a stronger tendency to question leaders.  
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Figure 2: Attitudes towards Equality Values 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
Figure 3 represents attitudes towards the more practical side of equality. In 
relation to the opportunity to exit poverty, the mean value of respondents 
self-identifying with the right, and the center–right, clearly believe that there 
are equal opportunities to do so. Hence, what is reected in this case is the 
belief in self-responsibility in determining one’s rank in society. Surprisingly, 
the mean of the left falls onto the regional line, whereas the group of the 
center–left shows the most “leftist” attitude and, together with the center, 
believes that equal chances to exit poverty are not given. We nd a similar 
distribution when we examine the statement: someone who has been born 
poor and works hard can become rich. As before, the center–right and the 
right believe that human activism decides an individual’s fate, whereas the 
center, the left and the center–left do not, and fall on the opposite side of 
the line indicating the regional mean.  
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Figure 3: Attitudes towards ‘Actual’ Equality 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
Finally, diverging views over the involvement of private enterprise in health 
care and electricity are depicted in Figure 4. Again, although the ve ideo-
logical camps are close to the regional mean, in both cases, this graphical 
representation displays divisions among the ideological categories as ex-
pected. In general, the right and the center–right are more inclined to con-
cede a larger role for the private sector in health and utility provision, 
whereas those in the center and on the center–left and the left favor only 
minor market involvement in the provision of these goods.  
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Figure 4: Attitudes towards State vs. Market 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
On the whole, these gures have highlighted trends in attitudes towards 
equality and inequality and their connection with left–right self-placements 
of Latin American citizens that resonate with our core denition of the left–
right divide. Yet, as these graphs rely on a summary measure such as the 
mean, they attenuate uctuations in the responses and cannot show struc-
tures and patterns in the data, such as associations among categories. There-
fore, in the next section we explore such associations more systematically.  
Attitudes, Associations and Ideology
Once individuals display coherent patterns of answers across the questions 
tapping attitudes towards (in)equality, we can condently assume a coherent 
reasoning and understanding and match these patterns against the left–right 
self-placement of respondents.7 To explore the relationship among our 
response groups, we use the method of joint correspondence analysis (JCA), 
7  Here we understand coherence in the sense that respondents do not defend totally 
opposing ideas across the questions selected – inequality in one equality in the oth-
er. About the functional role of vagueness in ideology, see Freeden (1996).  
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an extension of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). This is an explora-
tory technique, which has been adopted by many disciplines “as a highly 
informative and intuitive method for graphically depicting the association 
that exists between two or more categorical variables” (Lombardo and Beh 
2010: 2101). Thus, JCA is particularly useful for our purpose here, given that 
we are dealing with survey data, the responses to which form categorical 
variables.  
Joint correspondence analysis can be understood as a generalization of 
principal component analysis for categorical variables (cf. Izenman 2008: 
658). It seeks a linear combination of the data that accounts for a large part 
of the information and produces coordinates and weights, which are similar 
to factor loadings. This not only allows us to plot these scores and thus to 
visualize the relationships between the categories of the variables in a spatial 
map, but also to relate these weights to the left–right self-placements of 
individuals to see whether they are meaningfully connected (Greenacre and 
Pardo 2006: 193). For example, by performing JCA, we can visually deter-
mine whether agreeing strongly with private sector participation in the elec-
tricity sector is associated with agreeing strongly with private sector partici-
pation in health care and how, in turn, the obtained weights are linked to the 
ideological categories of left, center–left, center, center–right and right.  
We estimate two different JCA models. The rst one utilizes the nine 
questions measuring attitudes towards equality and the two questions relat-
ing to attitudes towards democracy. The second adds the ve questions 
capturing the state versus market divide. In both models we also use the 
categorical variable for left–right self-placement as a supplementary variable. 
This means that this variable, and the associations of the individual catego-
ries, will be represented in the resulting graph, however, it does not affect 
the JCA solution. The figures plot the rst dimension on the x-axis against 
the second dimension on the y-axis. The answer categories are labeled in 
grey font, while the supplemental variable is labeled in black font. For ease 
of inspection, we include horizontal and vertical reference lines at the zero 
points of each axis.  
Figure 5 illustrates the results for the JCA model for equality and de-
mocracy. Together, the two dimensions explain 87.5 percent of the inertia in 
the data, which is best thought of as equivalent to explained variance in 
principal component analysis. Overall, dimension one separates respondents 
with positive attitudes towards democracy from those with negative atti-
tudes, whereas the second dimension distinguishes those who consider ine-
qualities as a state of nature from those who advocate state intervention to 
overcome inequality. As indicated by the supplemental variable, this latter 
dimension does indeed separate left from right, whereas the former dimen-
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sion does not. Hence, the core denition of the left–right distinction rooted 
in (in)equality is reected in the answering patterns of Latin American citi-
zens and their self-placement on the left–right dimension. As expected, the 
authoritarian-democratic cleavage constitutes an orthogonal dimension to 
this ideological distinction.  
Figure 5: Joint Correspondence Analysis, without State vs. Market 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
Since categories that are close to each other have high associations, this 
graphical representation summarizes key features of the data in a low di-
mensional space, making associations among individual categories apparent. 
For instance, on the right side of the vertical line, those who believe that 
democracy is always preferable are close to those who strongly agree with 
the assertion that democracy is the best system, despite problems this re-
gime type might entail. Yet, respondents who ‘only’ agree with this latter 
statement, are not very well presented by this rst dimension, as we nd this 
category close to the origin, i.e. the vertical zero line. On the opposite end 
however, all categories are well depicted by this dimension. Disagreement 
with the statement that democracy is the best system of governance is asso-
ciated with the statement that sometimes an authoritarian regime is prefera-
ble, and in fact, both categories overlap. In their vicinity we can also observe 
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those who say that the type of regime is irrelevant to them. The exposed 
position of ‘strongly disagree’ with democracy as the best system simply 
indicates that this category is different from all others, although this re-
sponse has a tendency to be associated with leftist statements on equality.  
Turning to the second dimension regarding equality we also nd inter-
esting associations. In general, the right and the center–right are associated 
with the conviction that there are equal opportunities to exit poverty, that a 
hard working poor person can become rich, and that individuals should be 
responsible for their own welfare. Furthermore, we can see that respect for 
authority; a negative mindset towards women in politics; the idea that some-
times it is better to ignore laws and nd immediate solutions to a problem; 
and the belief that care for the elderly is an individual’s responsibility, are 
associated with each other and with those on the right. Yet, as indicated by 
the position of the ideological label of the left, which we nd slightly to the 
left of the horizontal zero line, compared with the center and the center–
left, the left shows a minor tendency to be associated with those latter ‘right-
ist’ categories. From this graph, it seems then that the center and the center–
left have a stronger association with leftist attitudes towards equality. Above 
all, they are associated with respect for rights and support for a free society; 
a preference for questioning leaders; the belief that there are not equal op-
portunities to exit poverty, and that there are barriers to social mobility; and 
support for state responsibility for the welfare of society. 
We can plot the predicted scores over our different ideological catego-
ries. As indicated in the left hand pane in Figure 6, the JCA weights again 
underline that the rst dimension does not help us to distinguish between 
left and right in Latin America. On average, Latin American respondents in 
the extreme categories are more in favor of democratic principles than the 
center or the center–left. Conversely, the second dimension capturing the 
core denition of the left–right distinction rooted in differing attitudes to-
wards equality, illustrates a clear separation between the left, and right, with 
those in the center expressing attitudes more akin to the left.  
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Figure 6: MCA Weights, Core Definition, Categorical Left–Right 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
These overall distinctions are preserved when we add the questions concern-
ing the state versus market divide to our analysis, albeit with a minor differ-
ence. Figure 7 shows the results of our second JCA model. In this case, 
combined, both dimensions explain 81.3 percent of inertia in the data. The 
rst dimension can be identied as an explicit separation of the left from the 
right based on the state versus market divide. The second dimension, in 
turn, distinguishes radical positions from more moderate positions on the 
questions asked. This is also corroborated by a look at the supplemental 
variable, the ve categories denoting ideological self-identication. On the 
left side of the vertical zero line on dimension one, we nd leftist positions 
favoring little or no private sector involvement in the provision of public 
utilities, public services or private sector participation in the extractive indus-
try. The left, the center–left and the center, fall onto this side of the graph. 
On the opposite side, the categories of the right and the center–right defend 
major or complete private sector participation in the economy. On dimen-
sion two, in the upper part of the graph, we observe respondents who reveal 
extreme stances on the attitudes captured. They would, for instance, prefer 
either complete private sector involvement in the economy or complete 
public sector involvement, or they would strongly agree with the Churchilli-
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an question, or strongly disagree with this question. Unsurprisingly, such 
positions are associated with the extreme categories of left or right, where 
we would nd those who are most politicized in ideological terms. We nd 
less politicized respondents in the center and center–right categories, who 
are associated with the more moderate responses on the lower side of the 
graph. They would, for instance, either favor minor or major private sector 
involvement or tend to ‘only’ agree or disagree with the Churchillian ques-
tion. The center–left, on the other hand, does not seem to be well repre-
sented by the second dimension.  
Figure 7: Joint Correspondence Analysis, with State vs. Market  
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
A look at the weights obtained from this JCA model claries these associa-
tions further. As the left hand pane of Figure 8 clearly shows, the state ver-
sus market divide separates the left from the right, and again, on average, the 
center tends to side with leftist positions. The right hand pane, in turn, clear-
ly illustrates the close connection between extreme attitudes and extreme 
ideological self-identification. The left and the right are both, on average, 
associated with more assertive responses, in comparison to those in the 
other three ideological groups.  
 20 Nina Wiesehomeier and David Doyle 
Figure 8: MCA Weights, Core Definition Plus State vs. Market, Categorical 
Left–Right 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
With the weights obtained from our JCA models, we can now move to our 
nal question of interest, and test whether our dimensions are meaningfully 
related to the self-placement of respondents on the left–right divide. To do 
so, we estimate ordered logit models on the ve-point categorical variable 
from left (1) to right (5), but we also replicate these results as logit models 
using a binary dependent variable.8 Our primary explanatory variables are an 
individual’s predicted scores (weights) for the two dimensions generated by 
each of the joint correspondence analyses. As we have seen, in the rst 
model, dimension one separates attitudes towards democracy, and we there-
fore do not expect any relationship with our dependent variable. On the 
second dimension, negative values are related to leftist positions and posi-
tive values to rightist positions concerning equality. Hence, we expect to 
nd a positive relationship between this dimension and the left–right self-
placement of Latin American citizens. Regarding the second model, expecta-
tions are reversed. In that case, the rst dimension showed a clear distinc-
tion between left and right on the state vs. market divide and again, negative 
8  This variable is coded 0 - left, 1 - right. 
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values indicate left positions and positive values right positions. Therefore, 
we expect this dimension to have a positive effect on our dependent varia-
ble. Finally, the results for the second dimension of this model do not dis-
tinguish among ideological proclivities, but between the degree of radicaliza-
tion of the respondents, which should be unrelated to preferences in left–
right terms.  
We include important control variables in the models, all taken from 
the Latinobarómetro survey. Education represents the survey respondent’s 
level of education and ranges from 1 (illiterate) to 7 (completed tertiary-
level).9 For income, we use the subjective economic ladder question, which 
asks respondents to place themselves on a 10-step ladder, where the poorest 
stand on the first step and the richest stand on the last. Marital status is a 
categorical variable with married respondents coded as 1, single respondents 
as 2 and divorced respondents as 3, while sex is a binary variable with 1 
representing male and 2 female. Age is simply the stated age of the survey 
respondent. Indigenous controls for ethnic background, and is based on the 
question concerning the respondent’s mother tongue. Those who state that 
their mother tongue is an indigenous language are coded as 1, and the rest as 
0. Unemployed, homemaker, public worker and private worker are dummy 
variables coded from the answers given to the current employment situation 
question.10 Finally, devout controls for the degree of piousness among citi-
zens, from 1 (very devout) to 4 (not at all devout).  
Table 2 displays the results for our four models. Models (1) and (3) are 
the main models of interest, with the categorical measure of left–right self-
placement as the dependent variable, while models (2) and (4) replicate the 
results with a dummy variable for left–right. In models (1) and (2), as antici-
pated, the dimension capturing the authoritarian-democratic cleavage is not 
related to respondents’ self-placement on the left–right dimension. On the 
contrary however, the dimension representing our core denition of the 
left–right distinction, equality, is signicant at the ten percent level and 
shows a substantive positive effect on our categorical dependent variable, 
which is magnied when we use the dummy variable. Individuals with right-
ist leanings towards equality indeed tend to self-identify with right positions. 
As the results for models (3) and (4) show, the same is true for individuals 
who favor a larger private sector involvement in the economy and thus 
reveal a higher affinity towards market mechanisms. The coefficient for the 
state versus market divide is positive and highly signicant at the one per-
9  The full coding is as follows: 1 - illiterate, 2 - incomplete primary, 3 - complete 
primary, 4 - incomplete secondary, 5 - complete secondary, 6 - incomplete tertiary, 
and 7 - complete tertiary. 
10  Retired, students and self-employed were omitted as reference categories.  
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cent level. However, its substantive effect is much smaller. As expected, the 
dimension capturing the radicalization of Latin American respondents is not 
able to differentiate the ideological categories.  
Table 2: Results Ordered Logit and Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables LR LR Dummy LR LR Dummy 
Education 0.936*** 0.903*** 0.933*** 0.898*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Marital status 1.007 0.995 1.009 0.998 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.029) (0.034) 
Sex 0.999 0.983 0.998 0.985 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) 
Age 1.008*** 1.006*** 1.008*** 1.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Indigenous 0.705* 0.556** 0.690* 0.548** 
 (0.148) (0.165) (0.132) (0.148) 
Unemployed 0.955 1.012 0.951 1.000 
 (0.104) (0.116) (0.103) (0.114) 
Homemaker 1.113* 1.109* 1.114* 1.114* 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.068) 
Devout 0.947 0.960 0.946 0.959 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.040) 
Income 1.108*** 1.077*** 1.113*** 1.084*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
Public worker 0.940 0.914 0.949 0.922 
 (0.071) (0.077) (0.072) (0.079) 
Private worker 1.027 1.037 1.028 1.038 
 (0.073) (0.107) (0.074) (0.107) 
Democracy 0.876 1.811 - - 
(Dimension 1) (0.481) (1.103) - - 
Equality 7.592* 17.847** - - 
(Dimension 2) (8.157) (21.027) - - 
State vs. Market - - 1.459*** 1.946*** 
(Dimension 1) - - (0.191) (0.330) 
Moderates vs. 
Radicals - - 0.866 0.972 
(Dimension 2) - - (0.129) (0.173) 
Observations 13,598 13,598 13,598 13,598 
Note: Cell entries are odd ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
Several of our control variables also are meaningfully related to the self-
placement of respondents. Across all models, education has a weak negative, 
but highly signicant effect on left–right placement, indicating that individu-
als with a higher education tend to identify with the left. The same relation-
ship can be found for our variable measuring ethnic background, indige-
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nous, albeit with a much bigger impact income, on the other hand, displays a 
highly signicant and positive relationship with ideological preference. Re-
spondents who consider themselves as materially well-off have a tendency 
to self-identify with the ideological right. The same is true for homemakers 
and older respondents, although in the latter case with a rather weak effect. 
The remaining variables never reach conventional levels of statistical 
signicance.11 
To get a more nuanced idea of the impact of the dimensions identified 
in our JCA analyses on respondents’ left–right placements, we generate 
predicted probabilities for each category of our dependent variable. We 
create four distinct respondent profiles which are based on their attitudes 
towards equality and the role of the market versus the state in the economic 
realm, whereas the dimensions constituting orthogonal divides towards the 
left–right divide are, together with our remaining explanatory variables, set 
at their respective mean values. Thus, we generate predicted probabilities for 
a defender of state involvement to overcome inequalities; a supporter for 
state involvement in the economy; a believer in self-responsibility; and a 
pro-market respondent, where each dimension is set at its minimum or 
maximum value according to the respondent’s profile. 
Table 3 displays the predicted probabilities for each of these proles. 
The results are instructive and rather stark. The probability of an average 
democrat favoring state intervention to overcome inequalities identifying 
with the extreme left is 0.23 compared with just 0.14 for the right. Con-
versely, the probability of someone considering inequalities as a state of 
nature identifying with the right is 0.34 compared with just 0.09 to self-place 
on the ideological left. It is evident that differing attitudes towards equality 
impact on people’s attachment to ideological labels and thus on the ideolog-
ical self-identification of citizens across Latin America. Although we see 
similar patterns for the state versus market divide, interestingly they are not 
as pronounced. With 0.28, a pro-market supporter has indeed a higher 
probability to self-identify with the right compared to a probability of 0.11 
to do so with the left. However, a defender of state involvement in the 
economy has the same probability of 0.18 of either identifying with the left 
or the right.  
11  To test the robustness of our results, we also estimated a number of alternative 
specications. Firstly, in order to test the stability of the models, we performed a 
modied jackknife, a modication which did not alter the results presented here. 
Secondly, we ran collinearity diagnostics, the results of which indicated that this 
was not an issue in any of our models. These results are available upon request.  
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Table 3: Predicted Probabilities for Ideological Self-identification 
Profile Left 
Center–
Left 
Center 
Center–
Right 
Right 
Pro-equality, 
Democracy Mean 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.14 
Pro-inequality, 
Democracy Mean 0.09 0.11 0.29 0.18 0.34 
Pro-market, Radi-
calism Mean 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.28 
Pro-state, Radical-
ism Mean 0.18 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.18 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
This gets even more evident when we turn to Table 4, which shows the 
changes in predicted probabilities when we switch the values of our four 
dimensions from their minimum to their maximum values. These results 
show that attitudes towards equality as captured by our core definition have 
by far the biggest impact on ideological self-identification. A change from 
the minimum to the maximum value for this dimension diminishes the 
probabilities of self-identifying with the left by 0.10 and increases the prob-
abilities of doing so with the ideological right by 0.13. In comparison, the 
effect of switching from anti-market to pro-market stances is much weaker 
and decreases the probability of identifying with the left by just 0.06. Simi-
larly, the increase of the probability to relate with the right for such a switch 
is just 0.09.  
Table 4: Changes in Predicted Probabilities 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
As expected, the two dimensions indicating divides that are orthogonal to 
the left–right distinction, taken on their own, do not exert a noteworthy 
influence on ideological self-placement. However, being pro-democratic and 
showing a more radical answering pattern seems to be more connected to 
leftism.  
Change minimum 
to maximum 
Left 
Center–
Left 
Center 
Center–
Right 
Right 
Equality to Inequali-
ty -0.101 -0.065 -0.012 0.048 0.131 
Anti-democracy to 
Pro-democracy 0.007 0.005 0.002 -0.004 -0.01 
Anti-market to Pro-
market -0.067 -0.045 -0.013 0.032 0.093 
Moderate to Radical 0.017 0.012 0.004 -0.008 -0.024 
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Combined, these results reflect that the conceptualization of the left–
right distinction rooted in shared beliefs concerning attitudes towards 
(in)equality is indeed manifest on the mass level and that this core distinc-
tion is pre-eminent over a policy oriented definition when it comes to ideo-
logical self-placement. In other words, our findings for the state versus mar-
ket divide reflect the heterogeneity of economic policy-making in the region. 
This is especially visible in the case of state involvement in the economy, 
where on average distinctions between the left and the right are muted, 
which might also reflect historical trajectories of economic planning in dif-
ferent countries. Given underlying core principles, there is room for the 
practical configuration of these into economic planning (or other policy 
issues for that matter) as is reflected in different schools of ideology defend-
ing differing degrees of state activism or personal responsibility.  
Conclusion  
As in other parts of the world, ideological labels are shortcuts to describe 
and analyze Latin American politics and to define expectations about politi-
cal behavior and policy content. Nowhere has that become more evident 
than in relation with the recent ‘left turn’ across the region. The large body 
of scholarship this phenomenon has generated places emphasis on electoral 
demands and the content of the policies introduced by these left parties (see 
Stokes 2009; Lupu 2009; Baker and Greene 2011). However, while the sub-
stantive meaning of ideological labels has been explored at the elite level 
(Power and Zucco 2009; Puig and Cué 2008), empirical analyses of the 
meaning of left and right for the Latin American electorate more generally 
are non-existent. This paper has attempted to address this lacuna, and to 
determine whether voters, across the region, form coherent groups along 
ideological lines. 
Utilizing a core distinction between left and right that is predicated up-
on differing attitudes towards equality, the analysis in this paper has demon-
strated that, taken as a whole, the Latin American electorate does indeed 
form distinct ideological groups, which share common convictions regard-
ing the responsibility of the state to level the playing field and its role in the 
national economy. Our results from the joint correspondence analyses show 
that theoretical conceptions about the roots of, and responsibility for, ine-
quality in society, together with the practical translation of these beliefs into 
economic policy, clearly distinguish those on the right from those on the 
left. Furthermore, the central dimensions emerging from these analyses – 
differing attitudes towards equality and the state versus market divide – are 
pre-eminent predictors of the left–right placement of respondents.  
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While it is important to remember that this is an analysis for the Latin 
American electorate as a whole, which might mask important idiosyncratic 
differences between left and right at the country-level (see Zechmeister 
2006; Harbers, de Vries, and Steenbergen forthcoming), nonetheless, our 
results here have important implications. 
Firstly, it suggests that, just as legislators across the region, the Latin 
American electorate has a clear and coherent understanding of the ideologi-
cal tenets of left and right. Given that politics across Latin America is fre-
quently characterized as clientelistic and dominated by appeals to mass pat-
ronage (see Remmer 2002; Kitschelt 2000), if both the electorate and the 
political elite can be differentiated along ideological lines, then this could 
have important implications for the nature of party-voter linkages across the 
region. It indicates the possibility of a connection beyond clientelism that 
political parties might tap into in order to garner support. Exactly how these 
linkages are established, and the form they assume however, requires further 
investigation. 
Secondly, if the electorate displays clear and coherent convictions, 
which attach them to different ideological camps, potential linkages between 
parties and voters could be established on the basis of these convictions. As 
a corollary to the point above, this implies that the left-turn might have a 
substantive policy content. Voters, dissatisfied with the policies of right-
leaning incumbents, and with clear ideological beliefs about inequality and 
the role of the state in the productive economy, supported parties and can-
didates that reflected these beliefs. However, as our results indicate, whereas 
the core definition rooted in equality has a strong connection with left–right 
self-identification of Latin American voters, the market versus state dimen-
sion attenuates some of these strong distinctions. Put differently, across 
Latin American countries, there seem to exist a shared ideological core, yet 
depending on country contexts, the translation of these core beliefs about 
(in)equality into actual policy and proposals might differ. So, as we have 
been witnessing, the elected leftist governments have, to varying degrees, 
delivered increased social spending to address inequities within society and 
have strengthened the role of the state in the national economy (see Baker 
and Greene 2011; Stokes 2009), but there is no uniform “new left” model 
for the economy. Rather, we have a heterogeneous group of political leaders 
and parties that voice similar rhetoric about indigence, but who oversee the 
practical translation of this rhetoric into economic policy in a myriad differ-
ent manners, and which often reflects varying national contexts. However, 
the divisions that exists across countries regarding the left–right divide and 
how this informs various attitudes towards economic policy, is a task for 
future research.  
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Actitudes, asociaciones ideológicas y la dimensión de izquierda-
derecha en América Latina  
Resumen: ¿Comparten los ciudadanos de América Latina una concepción 
común de la dimensión ideológica izquierda-derecha? Y si es así, ¿estará esta 
concepción vinculada a la auto-identificación ideológica de los individuos? 
Este trabajo aborda estos planteamientos seleccionando preguntas del La-
tinobarómetro del año 2006, con base en una definición básica de la división 
izquierda-derecha que se arraiga en la teoría y filosofía política. Utilizamos el 
análisis de correspondencia conjunto para explorar si los ciudadanos que 
comparten la misma identificación ideológica también poseen convicciones 
y creencias similares y coherentes que reflejan el contenido ideológico de la 
dimensión izquierda-derecha. Nuestro análisis indica que las concepciones 
teóricas acerca de las raíces de, y de la responsabilidad para, la desigualdad 
en la sociedad, junto con la traducción de estas creencias en actitudes con 
respecto a la distinción estado-mercado, distinguen a aquellos que se identi-
fican con la izquierda de los que se identifican con la derecha.  
Palabras clave: América Latina, izquierda-derecha, desigualdad, opinión 
pública, análisis de correspondencia conjunta 
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Appendix
Survey Questions Used, Latinobarómetro 2006 
Self-positioning on Left–Right Scale 
P47ST. In politics, people normally speak of “left” and “right”. On a scale 
where (0) is left and (10) is right, where would you place yourself? 
(96) None (97) DA (98) DK  
Democracy 
P17ST. Which of the following statements do you agree with most? 
(1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, OR 
(2) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be prefera-
ble to a democratic one, OR 
(3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a 
non-democratic regime.  
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
P22STA. Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of 
government. Do you (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly 
Disagree (0) DK/DA 
Equality Values 
P28NF. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose 
statement: 
A. We should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders, OR 
B. As citizens, we should show more respect for authority.  
(1) Strongly agree with A (2) Agree with A (3) Agree with B (4) Agree 
strongly with B (0) NA (7) None (8) DK 
 
P29NF. Which of the following two statements is closest to your view? 
Choose statement A or B: 
A. It is better to find legal solutions to problems even if it takes longer, OR 
B. It is sometimes better to ignore the law to solve problems immediately. 
(1) Strongly agree with A (2) Agree with A (3) Agree with B (4) Agree 
strongly with B (0) NA (7) None (8) DK 
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P30ST. Do you believe that it is better to live in an orderly society where 
certain freedoms are limited, or do you believe it is better to live in a society 
where all rights and freedoms are respected, although there may be less 
order as a result? 
(0) I prefer to live in an orderly society although some freedoms, OR 
(1) I prefer to live in a society where all rights are respected. 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
P87N_1. From the following options, choose the main reasons why you 
think there are not enough women in public office, or do you think there are 
women in public office?  
Women are not qualified. 
(0) Not mentioned (1) Mentioned 
 
P87N_5. From the following options, choose the main reasons why you 
think there are not enough women in public office, or do you think there are 
women in public office?  
This is not their place. 
(0) Not mentioned (1) Mentioned 
‘Actual’ Equality 
P12N. Do you think that in (country) a person who is born poor and works 
hard can become rich, or do you think it is not possible to be born poor and 
become rich?  
(0) Born poor working hard can become rich, OR 
(1) Born poor can never get rich. 
(0) DK/DA 
 
P14ST. There are different opinions about equal opportunities in (country). 
Some people say that the economic system in (country) enables all (national-
ity) to have equal opportunities to exit poverty. Which of these opinions is 
closer to your way of thinking? 
(1) Have equal opportunities (2) Do not have equal opportunities (0) DA (8) 
DK 
 
P73N. Who is mainly responsible for seeing that old people live in dignified 
conditions? 
(1) The State  
(2) Family 
(3) Each individual is responsible 
 32 Nina Wiesehomeier and David Doyle 
(0) DK/DA 
 
P15ST. On a scale from (1) to (10), where 1 means that each person should 
take responsibility for his own welfare, and 10 means the government 
should take responsibility for the welfare of the people, where would you 
put yourself?  
(0) DA (97) None (98) DK 
State vs. Market 
P76N. How much participation should the private sector have in the area of 
health? (1) Completely in charge 
(0) Major participation 
(1) Minor participation 
(2) No participation 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
P76N.B. How much participation should the private sector have in the area 
of education?  
(1) Completely in charge 
(2) Major participation 
(3) Minor participation 
(4) No participation 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
P76N.C. How much participation should the private sector have in the area 
of mineral extraction?  
(0) Completely in charge 
(1) Major participation 
(2) Minor participation 
(3) No participation 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
P76N.F. How much participation should the private sector have in the area 
of electricity distribution and production?  
(1) Completely in charge 
(2) Major participation 
(3) Minor participation 
(4) No participation 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
 Left–Right Divide in Latin America 33 
P76N.G. How much participation should the private sector have in the area 
of water distribution and production?  
(1) Completely in charge 
(2) Major participation 
(3) Minor participation 
(4) No participation 
(0) DA (8) DK 
 
 
